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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clayton Adams appeals following the district court’s denial of his motion for credit
for time served. Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred when it denied his
motion requesting credit for time served on his aggravated battery sentence. When
Mr. Adams was sentenced in 2007, the aggravated battery sentence was ordered to be
served consecutively to the second degree murder sentence, but the second degree
murder sentence was subsequently vacated by the district court as part of Mr. Adams’
post-conviction relief. When that sentence was vacated, the consecutive nature of his
sentences ended as there was no sentence to which the aggravated battery could be
consecutive to. At Mr. Adams’ re-sentencing on the second degree murder charge in
2014, the district court did not specify whether the new second degree murder sentence
was consecutive to, or concurrent to, the aggravated battery charge.

Thus, the

sentences are concurrent and Mr. Adams is owed credit for time served for the
aggravated battery conviction.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contentions that the district
court did not vacate the sentence for second degree murder and that the consecutive
nature of the aggravated battery survived the second degree murder re-sentencing.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Adams’ Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Adams’ motion for credit for time served?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Adams’ Motion For Credit For Time Served
Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for
credit for time served. Although Mr. Adams’ sentence on the conviction for aggravated
battery was initially ordered to run consecutively to the conviction for second degree
murder when he was sentenced in 2007, the consecutive nature of his sentences
vanished when his second degree murder sentence was vacated.

Upon his

resentencing in 2014, the district court did not specify that the second degree murder
sentence was consecutive to the aggravated battery; thus, the sentences are
concurrent and Mr. Adams should receive credit for time served on both cases.
The State claims that the second degree murder sentence1 was never “vacated.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.6, n.2.)

Notably, Mr. Adams did not claim that the record

contains an order that uses the word “vacated”; however, even if we use the word
“terminated” or “set aside” in lieu of the word “vacated”, the effect is the same. See
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (definition of vacate as “to nullify or cancel; make
void; invalidate”.) The sentence for second degree murder went away, when the district
court ordered a re-sentencing. The sentence was not being corrected, he was being
sentenced anew. Common sense tells us that two sentences for the same offense
cannot exist simultaneously. By operation of necessity the old sentence was vacated
when the district court ordered re-sentencing, whether the district court used the word
“vacated” or not. That is, in order to re-sentence someone, the initial sentence must go

The State correctly points out that “[t]he second degree murder charge was never
vacated.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.) Appellant’s brief did incorrectly refer to the
sentence as a charge. See Appellant’s Brief, p.9.

1
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away. See, i.e., U.S. Maxwell, 590 F.3d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bye, J., dissenting,
“[i]t is axiomatic that there could not be re-sentencings without the vacation of the
‘original’ terms of imprisonment”).
The State argues that Mr. Adams’ “sentence for aggravated battery has
consistently remained consecutive to his sentence for second degree murder”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.6); however, such a claim ignores the necessity of the district
court first setting aside, vacating, terminating, etc., the second degree murder sentence
and ordering re-sentencing on that count only. Even if second degree murder sentence
was merely “set aside,” this would still mean it had ceased to exist, and a sentence that
does not exist cannot be consecutive to anything or have another sentence continue to
be consecutive to it.
Further, the State’s argument misunderstands the meaning of a consecutive
sentence.

In quoting the district court’s language ordering “said sentences ‘to run

consecutively’” (Respondent’s Brief, p.7), the State supposes that the meaning of
“consecutive sentence” is reciprocal, not a word meaning “[t]wo or more sentences of
jail time to be served in sequence” (Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)) and logic
dictates that one sentence must be served first, for the second to follow consecutively.
(See R., p.30.)
The State argues that Idaho Code § 18-308 is applicable (Respondent’s Brief,
p.8); however, by the plain language of that statute it only applies before sentence has
been pronounced upon the defendant for either sentence. See State v. Clapper, 143
Idaho 338, 341 (2006) (holding that I.C. § 18-308 did not apply where sentence in case
no. 02-4630 was announced two years before the terms of probation were ordered to
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run consecutive to the previous sentence).2 This was no longer the circumstance here,
where the sentence first imposed was set aside/vacated.
In its order denying Mr. Adams motion for credit for time served, the district court
relies on State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246 (Ct. App. 2003) (R., p.66); however, the Dreier
Court held that the judgment of conviction was ambiguous because it was unclear in
what order the consecutive sentences were to be served. 139 Idaho at 254. Unlike the
sentences in Dreier, Mr. Adams’ sentence in Count I, second degree murder, was
imposed first in open court, and was identified as the first sentence in the written
judgment of conviction.

(5/8/07 Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13; R., pp.33-34.)

The

sentence on the second count, the aggravated battery, was therefore consecutive to the
second degree murder sentence.

(R., pp.33-34.)

Unlike Dreier, the original oral

pronouncement of Mr. Adams’ sentences were consistent with the original written
judgment of conviction.
Dreier is helpful to Mr. Adams’ argument in that the Court of Appeals found the
sentences were unclear and must be remanded because the written judgment was
inconsistent with the oral pronouncement as to which sentence would be served first.
Id. Such a holding confirms Mr. Adams argument that, when sentencing a defendant to

The Idaho Court of Appeals in Clapper analyzed the propriety of a consecutive
sentence, holding that the trial court had common-law authority to impose cumulative
sentences and that I.C. § 18-308 was not intended to abrogate or limit the common law
rule and only applied to cases within its scope. Id. at 341. Thus, while the district court
had the authority under the common law to order the second degree murder sentence
to be consecutive to the aggravated battery sentence, it did not do so when it resentenced Mr. Adams.
2
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consecutive sentences, one sentence must be imposed first, then the next sentence is
consecutive to that.3 One follows the other in sequence.
In 2007, Mr. Adams’ sentence on the conviction for aggravated battery was
ordered to be served consecutive to the conviction for second degree murder. When
the first sentence for second degree murder was vacated, the consecutive nature of his
sentences vanished as there was no sentence to which the aggravated battery could be
consecutive. Upon his resentencing in 2014, the district court did not specify that the
second degree murder was consecutive to the aggravated battery; thus, the sentences
are concurrent.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court remand his case with an order for
the district court to issue a corrected Amended Judgment of Conviction which clarifies
that the sentences are to be served concurrently, and which gives Mr. Adams the
requisite credit for time served on the aggravated battery sentence.
DATED this 25th day of October, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

To the extent this Court might decide the district court’s language in the initial
judgment was unclear in that the court used the language “to run consecutively,” the
Ninth Circuit analyzed similar language in Rice v. United States, 7 F.2d 319 (9th Cir.
1925), and held that a judgment setting forth the sentence on each count followed by
the phrase “to run consecutively” was sufficiently definite. 7 F.2d at 321 (holding that
the judgment was sufficiently definite as to the order of sequence in which the
sentences were to be served, because the word “consecutively” was used as equivalent
to “successively,” “succeeding one another in regular order;” that is to say, the term of
imprisonment on the first count was to be first served, and then the term of
imprisonment on the second count was to “succeed" or "come after.”).
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